Adithya Bhaskara

Undergraduate Researcher

I am an honors mathematics and computer science student at the University of Colorado Boulder.

I am broadly interested in theoretical computer science and algorithmic economics. Currently, I am seeking to understand liquidity provisioning in automated market makers, with applications to prediction markets for Arrow-Debreu securities and decentralized exchanges. I would like to learn more about computational social choice and complexity theory.

At this time, I hope for an academic career in theoretical computer science. I am an Undergraduate Researcher advised by Rafael Frongillo.

I am not Aditya Bhaskara, Associate Professor of Computer Science at the University of Utah.

news

Jul 08, 2024	I’ll be giving a talk at the Blockchain and Decentralized Finance workshop at EC’24 on Bhaskara et al. (2023), joint work with Rafael Frongillo and Maneesha Papireddygari.
Jun 28, 2024	I am honored to receive the Marlene Massaro Pratto and David Pratto Scholarship in Mathematics. This scholarship is awarded annually to exceptional upper level undergraduate Mathematics majors.
May 01, 2023	I’ll be starting at the algorithmic economics group at CU Boulder Theory, seeking to understand liquidity provisioning in automated market makers. I’ll be advised by Rafael Frongillo.
May 05, 2022	I’m honored to have presented on curricular work in cybersecurity I spearheaded at St. Vrain Valley Schools’ Innovation Center to Governor Jared Polis.
Apr 01, 2022	I am honored to receive the Boettcher Scholarship, a full-ride scholarship given to 50 Colorado high school seniors. This scholarship is awarded annually on the basis of superior scholastic ability and intellectual curiosity, evidence of leadership and involvement, service to community and school, and outstanding character.

selected publications

A General Theory of Liquidity Provisioning for Automated Market Makers

Adithya Bhaskara, Rafael M. Frongillo, and Maneesha Papireddygari

2023

Abs arXiv Bib Slides

In decentralized finance, it is common for automated market makers to provision liquidity from external parties. The market maker rewards these liquidity providers with a cut of the trading fees, in exchange for the risk they take on. A handful of protocols for liquidity provisioning have been proposed, such as Uniswap V2 and V3, with specific and sometimes complex rules for collecting liquidity deposits, executing trades, and dividing up fees. Beyond these examples, and a broader understanding of liquidity provisioning, and particularly the design space from which one could choose a different protocols, has been out of reach. In this work, we show that one can view liquidity provisioning very broadly as the practice of running several market makers "in parallel": each market maker provides its own liquidity, yet the combined group can operate as a single coherent market. We prove that this general protocol, when restricted to specific forms of the constituent market makers, recovers Uniswap V2 and V3 as special cases. We then go on to propose a new restriction which may have advantages over Uniswap V3. In the context of prediction markets, where computation costs are less constrained, our general protocol gives a maximally flexible way to provision liquidity. We conclude with remarks about the nature of liquidity and fees in markets with more than 2 assets, and several open questions.
@article{bhaskara2023general, title = {A General Theory of Liquidity Provisioning for Automated Market Makers}, author = {Bhaskara, Adithya and Frongillo, Rafael M. and Papireddygari, Maneesha}, year = {2023}, eprint = {2311.08725}, archiveprefix = {arXiv}, primaryclass = {cs.GT}, url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.08725}, }